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Abstract
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer payment system proposed by Nakamoto in 2008. Properties of the bitcoin
backbone protocol have been investigated in some depth: the blockchain growth property quantifies the
number of blocks added to the blockchain during any time intervals; the blockchain quality property
ensures the honest miners always contribute at least a certain fraction of the blockchain; the common
prefix property ensures if a block is deep enough, it will eventually be adopted by all honest miners with
high probability. Following the spirit of decoupling various functionalities of the blockchain, the Prism
protocol is proposed to dramatically improve the throughput while maintaining the same level of security.
Prior analyses of the bitcoin and Prism backbone protocols assume the lifespan of blockchain is finite. This
paper presents a streamlined and strengthened analysis without the finite horizon assumption. Specifically,
the results include a blockchain growth property, a blockchain quality property, and a common prefix
property of the bitcoin backbone protocol, as well as the liveness and persistence of the Prism backbone
protocol regardless of whether the blockchains have a infinite lifespan. We also express the properties
of bitcoin and Prism backbone protocols in explicit expressions rather than order optimal results, which
lead to tighter bounds and practical references for public transaction ledger protocol design.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The bitcoin backbone protocol
Bitcoin is an electronic payment system introduced by Nakamoto [1] in 2008. The system is built on
a distributed ledge technology commonly referred to as blockchain. Miners are distributed parties who
generate blocks and maintain their own version of the blockchain. A blockchain is a finite sequence of
blocks adopted by some miner at some point in time. It begins with a genesis block, and every subsequent
block contains a cryptographic hashing of the previous block. In order to generate a valid new block, a
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2miner need to find a nonce whose hash values satisfies a difficulty requirement. The process of finding
such a nonce is called mining. An honest miner follows the honest chain rule, i.e., it always adopts the
longest blockchain it heard about and mines on top of the longest blockchain. Since all miners work
simultaneously, it is possible that two or more different blocks are mined and announced at around the
same time. Then different honest miners may extend different blockchains depending on which longest
one they hear first. This phenomenon is called forking. Forking of a blockchain challenges network
consensus and presents opportunities for double spending attack, namely, a transaction included in the
longest fork is not included in a different fork that overtakes the first fork to become the longest one.
Nakamoto [1] characterized the race between the honest miners and an adversary with less than half
of the total mining power as a random walk with a drift. Nakamoto showed that the probability the
adversary blockchain overtakes the honest miner’s consensus blockchain vanishes exponentially over time.
Nakamoto argued that the bitcoin protocol is safe under double spending attack as long as one considers
a transaction confirmed only after enough new blocks are mined to extend the honest blockchain. An
in-depth analysis of the bitcoin protocol was given in [2]. Several important properties of the bitcoin
backbone protocol have been proposed in [1], [3]–[6]. Garay, Kiayias, and Leonardos [3] gave a formal
description and analysis of the bitcoin backbone protocol assuming a fully synchronous network, namely,
mining takes place in rounds and at the end of each round, all miners see all published blocks. Under
this model, [3] introduced a common prefix property and a blockchain quality property. The common
prefix property states if a block is k blocks deep in an honest miner’s blockchain, then the probability
that the block is not included by all other honest miners’ blockchain decreases exponentially with k. The
blockchain quality property states the honest miners always contribute at least a certain percentage of
the blockchain regardless of the strategy of adversarial parties. Then, [4] introduced a blockchain growth
property, which quantifies the number of blocks added to the blockchain during any time intervals.
Moreover, Nakamoto’s analysis was improved in [5] to address selfish mining. In this case, selfish
miners can introduce disagreement between honest miners and split their hashing power. Selfish miners
thus enhance their relative hashing power to win disproportionate rewards. This strategy, however, is not
designed for double spending purposes.
The bitcoin backbone protocol gives birth to numerous “robust public transaction ledger” protocols [7]–
[9]. The preceding properties guarantee two fundamental properties of a robust public transaction ledger:
liveness and persistence. Due to the blockchain growth property and the blockchain quality property,
blocks originating from honest miners will eventually end up at a level of more than k blocks of an
honest miner’s blockchain. Due to the common prefix property, an honest miner’s k-deep block remains
permanent.
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3The bitcoin backbone protocol can also be leveraged to solve other problems. For example, the bitcoin
backbone protocol ensures some basic properties for some randomized Byzantine agreement protocols
[10]–[14].
B. The Prism protocol
The throughput of bitcoin is limited by design to ensure security [15]. As mining rate increases, blocks
are more likely to be mined and announced simultaneously, i.e., forking is more likely to occur. Due
to the longest blockchain rule, only the blocks on the longest blockchain will eventually be adopted
by honest miners, and other honest blocks are wasted. Then the adversarial miners compete with fewer
honest miners. To avoid forking, the average time interval between new blocks is set to be much longer
than the latency for propagating a block to most miners in the network [16].
Many ideas have been proposed to improve the blockchain throughput while maintaining its security.
One way is to deal with high-forking blockchains by optimizing the forking rule. For example, GHOST
chooses the main blockchain according to the heaviest tree rule instead of the longest blockchain rule
[16]. Inclusive, Spectre, and Phantom construct a directed acyclic graph (DAG) structured blockchain
by introducing reference links between blocks in addition to the parent links [17]–[19]. However, these
protocols are vulnerable to certain attacks [20]–[22]. Generally speaking it is very challenging to make
high-forking protocols secure.
Another line of work is to decouple the various functionalities of the blockchain. For example,
BitcoinNG divides the bitcoin blockchain’s operations into leader selection and transaction serialization
[7]. In BitcoinNG, time is divided into epochs. During each epoch, a leader is chosen to order the
transaction blocks of that epoch. However, this protocol is vulnerable to bribery or targeted attacks to
leaders. In Fruitchain, transactions (fruits) are also decoupled from proposer blocks. However, fruitchain
focuses on enhancing fairness instead of improving throughput [23].
Following the spirit of decoupling blocks’ functionalities, Bagaria, Kannan, Tse, Fanti, and Viswanath
[9] proposed the Prism protocol, which is a structured-DAG blockchain with one proposer blockchain and
many voter blockchains. The voter blocks elect a leader block at each level of the proposer blockchain
by voting. The sequence of leader blocks concludes the contents of all voter blocks, and finalizes the
ledger. Each voter blockchain mines independently at a low mining rate. A voter blockchain follows the
bitcoin protocol to provide security to leader election process.
With this design, the throughput (containing the content of all voter blocks) is decoupled from the
mining rate of each voter blockchain. Slow mining rate guarantees the security of each voter blockchain
as well as the proposer blockchain. Prism achieves security against up to 50% adversarial hashing power,
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4optimal throughput up to the capacity of the network, and fast confirmation latency for honest transactions.
A thorough description and analysis is shown in [9].
C. Our results
Previous analysis on the backbone of bitcoin and Prism assumes a blockchain’s lifespan is finite, i.e.,
there exists a maximum round when the blockchain ends. For example, in [3], [6] and [9], the good
properties of blockchain hold only under typical events, i.e., the number of honest and adversarial blocks
mined must not deviate too much from their expected value over all long enough time intervals. The
probability of typical events was shown to depend on the blockchain’s maximum round parameter. Indeed,
the probability of the blockchain growth property, the blockchain quality property, and the common prefix
property are all expressed implicitly in terms of the blockchain’s maximum round.
In this paper, we drop the finite horizon assumption and prove strong properties of the bitcoin backbone
protocol. We define the typical events with respect to each interval: instead of requiring the number of
honest and adversarial blocks to be typical over all long enough time intervals, we only require them to be
typical over all time intervals that contain a certain interval that includes the transaction of interest. Since
the probability that the number of honest and adversarial blocks are “atypical” decreases exponentially
with interval length, the sum of the probabilities over all those intervals remains vanishingly small.
Thus we provide performance guarantees that are truly permanent whether or not the blockchain have a
finite lifespan. Moreover, without the finite horizon assumption, we express the properties of the bitcoin
backbone protocol in explicit expressions in lieu of order optimality results in some previous analysis.
The explicit expressions provide tighter bounds and more practical references to public transaction ledger
protocol design.
In [9], liveness and consistency properties of the Prism protocol were proved assuming a finite life span
of the blockchains [9]. In this paper, we also prove the liveness and consistency of the Prism protocol
without the finite horizon assumption.
II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We assume the total number of miners is n, among which t miners are adversarial and the remaining
miners are honest. Assume all miners have equal hash powers (if not, we assume they can be split into
equal-power pieces). Let
β =
t
n
(1)
denote the percentage of adversarial miners. We assume adversarial miners collectively have less than 12
of the total mining power in the blockchain network, so β ∈ [0, 12).
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5We adopt a discrete model where activities take place in rounds. If a miner publishes one or more
blocks in a round, all miners receive the block(s) at exactly the end of the round (a miner can only
react to round r blocks in round r+1). Evidently, by the end of each round, all honest miners are fully
synchronized. If a block is mined by an honest miner, we call it an honest block; otherwise the block
is called an adversarial block. We assume that during round 0, a single honest block, called the genesis
block, is mined and broadcast to all miners. For r ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let H[r] denote the number of all honest
blocks mined during round r. The mining difficulty and miner’ mining powers are adjusted to be constant
in all rounds r ≥ 1.
Without loss of generality, the mining power of all miners are and the mining difficulty are assumed to
remain constant, such that the probability that an honest miner mines a new block in every round r ≥ 1
is equal to p ∈ (0, 1).1 Note that H[r] ∼ Binomial(n− t, p). Define
X[r] =
1, if H[r] ≥ 10, otherwise. (2)
X[r] indicates if one or more honest blocks are mined during round r or not. Let
q = 1− (1− p)n−t. (3)
Then X[r] ∼ Bernoulli(q). Define
Y [r] =
1, if H[r] = 10, otherwise. (4)
Basically Y [r] indicates if a single honest block is mined in round r or not. Then Y [r] ∼ Bernoulli((n−
t)p(1 − p)n−t−1). A round r is called a uniquely successful round if Y [r] = 1. Let Z[r] upper bound
the number of adversarial blocks mined during round r (the adversarial miners may or may not publish
them). Then Z[r] ∼ Binomial(t, p).
It is important to note that H[1], H[2], . . . are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), which
form a stationary process. The same can be said of the X , Y , and Z sequences. Define
ξ =
1− 2β
1− β . (5)
Then ξ ∈ (0, 1].
For all integers s and r satisfying 1 ≤ s < r, let
H[s, r] =
r−1∑
i=s
H[i], (6)
1This probability is held constant by adjusting the mining difficulty in case the mining power fluctuate over rounds.
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6which represents the total number of honest blocks mined during rounds s, . . . , r − 1. To be consistent
with this notation, we mean all rounds up to and including r − 1 when we say “by round r”. Likewise,
we define
X[s, r] =
r−1∑
i=s
X[i] (7)
Y [s, r] =
r−1∑
i=s
Y [i] (8)
Z[s, r] =
r−1∑
i=s
Z[i]. (9)
Definition 1. By a blockchain we mean a finite sequence of blocks adopted by some miner at some point
in time which begins with a genesis block and that every subsequent block contains a cryptographic
hashing of the previous block. It is assumed that no block can be mined in an earlier round than its
immediate predecessor.
A blockchain’s prefix is also a blockchain. A blockchain must have the following properties: 1) Its
blocks must be mined in order; 2) it is immutable in the sense that it is computationally impossible for
any miner to mine a different blockchain that has the same genesis block and the same final block.
Definition 2. If a blockchain is adopted by an honest miner by some round, it is said to be honest.
It is assumed that, the mining difficulty is adjusted such that
q ≤ ξ
6
. (10)
III. THE BITCOIN BACKBONE PROTOCOL
We will make heavy use of Bernoulli’s inequality:
Proposition 3. (Bernoulli’s inequality) For every integer k ≥ 0 and real number x > −1,
(1 + x)k ≥ 1 + kx. (11)
Proposition 4. For r = 1, 2, . . . ,
q ≤ p(n− t) < q
1− q . (12)
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7Proof. As X[r] ∼ Bernoulli(q), we have
E[X[r]] = q (13)
= 1− (1− p)n−t (14)
≤ p(n− t), (15)
where (15) is due to Bernoulli’s inequality. Moreover,
q
1− q =
1− (1− p)n−t
(1− p)n−t (16)
= (1− p)−(n−t) − 1 (17)
> (1 + p)n−t − 1 (18)
≥ p(n− t), (19)
where (18) is due to (1 + p)(1− p) < 1 and (19) is due to Bernoulli’s inequality. By (15) and (19),
q ≤ p(n− t) < q
1− q . (20)
Proposition 5. For r = 1, 2, . . . ,
E[Y [r]] > q(1− q). (21)
Proof. According to Proposition 4, q ≤ 16 implies q < p(n− t) < 15 . Hence,
E[Y [r]] = p(n− t)(1− p)n−t−1 (22)
≥ p(n− t)(1− p(n− t− 1)) (23)
> p(n− t)(1− p(n− t)) (24)
> q(1− q), (25)
where (23) is due to Bernoulli’s inequality, and (25) holds because the function x(1 − x) is increasing
on [0, 12 ].
Proposition 6. For r = 1, 2, . . . ,
E[Z[r]] < E[X[r]]. (26)
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8Proof. Since Z[r] ∼ Binomial(t, p),
E[Z[r]] = pt (27)
=
t
n− tp(n− t) (28)
<
t
n− t
q
1− q (29)
= (1− ξ) 1
1− q q (30)
≤ 1− ξ
1− ξ6
q (31)
< E[X[r]], (32)
where (29) is due to Proposition 4 and (32) is due to q ≤ ξ6 .
Definition 7. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r, define event
E[s, r] := E1[s, r] ∩ E2[s, r] ∩ E3[s, r] (33)
where
E1[s, r] :=
{
(1− ξ
6
)E[X[s, r]] < X[s, r] < (1 +
ξ
6
)E[X[s, r]]
}
(34)
E2[s, r] :=
{
(1− ξ
6
)E[Y [s, r]] < Y [s, r]
}
(35)
E3[s, r] :=
{
Z[s, r] < E[Z[s, r]] +
ξ
6
E[X[s, r]]
}
. (36)
Under event E1[s, r], the number of rounds with honest block mined, X[s, r], does not deviate from
its expected value by more than a fraction of ξ6 . Under event E2[s, r], the number of uniquely successful
rounds Y [s, r] is no less than 1− ξ6 of its expected value. Under event E3[s, r], the upper bound for the
number of adversarial blocks is no more than its expected value plus ξ6 of the expectation of X[s, r].
Intuitively, under E[s, r], we have 1) a “typical” number of rounds during which at least one honest
block is mined, 2)“enough” uniquely successful rounds, and 3) the total number of adversarial blocks is
limited.
Proposition 8. (Chernoff bound, page 69 in [24]) Let X ∼ binomial(n, p). Then for every δ ∈ (0, 1],
P (X ≤ (1− δ)pn) ≤ e− δ
2pn
2 , (37)
and
P (X ≥ (1 + δ)pn) ≤ e− δ
2pn
3 . (38)
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9Define
γ =
ξ2
180
. (39)
Lemma 9. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r,
P (E[s, r]) > 1− 4e−γq(r−s), (40)
where γ is given in (39).
Proof. We first analyze events E1, E2, and E3 separately. We have
P (E1[s, r]
c) = P
(
|X[s, r]− E[X[s, r]]| ≥ ξ
6
E[X[s, r]]
)
(41)
= P
(
X[s, r] ≥ E[X[s, r]] + ξ
6
E[X[s, r]]
)
+ P
(
X[s, r] ≤ E[X[s, r]]− ξ
6
E[X[s, r]]
)
(42)
≤ 2e− ξ
2
108
q(r−s), (43)
where (43) is due to Proposition 8.
Also,
P (Ec2[s, r]) = P
(
Y [s, r] ≤ (1− ξ
6
)E[Y [s, r]]
)
(44)
≤ e− ξ
2
72
E[Y [s,r]] (45)
≤ e− ξ
2
72
(1−q)q(r−s) (46)
< e−
ξ2
72
(1− ξ
6
)q(r−s), (47)
where (45) is due to Proposition 8, (46) is due to Proposition 5, and (47) is due to q ≤ ξ6 .
Note that the moment generating function for binomial random variable Z[r] ∼ Binomial(t, p) is
(1− p+ peu)t (page 39 in [25]). We have
P (Ec3[s, r]) = P
(
Z[s, r] ≥ E[Z[s, r]] + ξ
6
E[X[s, r]]
)
(48)
≤ P
(
Z[s, r] ≥ E[Z[s, r]] + ξ
12
E[Z[s, r]] +
ξ
12
E[X[s, r]]
)
(49)
<
E
[
eZ[s,r]u
]
e(1+
ξ
12
)E[Z[s,r]]u+ ξ
12
E[X[s,r]]u (50)
=
(1− p+ peu)t(r−s)
e(1+
ξ
12
)(r−s)tpu+ ξ
12
(r−s)qu (51)
≤ e(eu−1−u(1+ ξ12 ))tp(r−s)− ξ12 qu(r−s), (52)
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where (49) is due to Proposition 6, (50) holds for all u ≥ 0 due to Chernoff’s inequality, and (52) is due
to 1 + x ≤ ex for every x ≥ 0 (here x = p(eu − 1)). Pick u = log(1 + ξ12). Then
P (Ec3[s, r]) ≤ e(
ξ
12
−(1+ ξ
12
) log(1+ ξ
12
))tp(r−s)− ξ12 log(1+ ξ12 )q(r−s) (53)
< e−
ξ
12
log(1+ ξ
12
)q(r−s) (54)
< e−
ξ2
180
q(r−s) (55)
where (54) is due to (1 + x) log(1 + x) > x for all x > 0, and (55) is due to log(1 + ξ12) >
ξ
15 for all
0 < ξ ≤ 1.
Thus,
P (E[s, r]) = 1− P (Ec[s, r]) (56)
≥ 1− P (Ec1[s, r])− P (Ec2[s, r])− P (Ec3[s, r]) (57)
> 1− 4e−γq(r−s) (58)
where γ is defined in (39), (58) is due to ξ
2
72(1− ξ6) > ξ
2
180 and
ξ2
108 >
ξ2
180 .
Lemma 10. (Typical properties lemma) For all integers 1 ≤ s < r, under event E[s, r], the following
holds.
(1− ξ
6
)q(r − s) < X[s, r] < (1 + ξ
6
)q(r − s) (59)
Y [s, r] > (1− ξ
3
)q(r − s) (60)
Z[s, r] < (1− 2ξ
3
)q(r − s) (61)
Z[s, r] < (1− ξ
2
)X[s, r] (62)
Z[s, r] < Y [s, r]. (63)
Proof. Under E[s, r], (59) follows directly from (34).
To prove (60),
Y [s, r] > (1− ξ
6
)q(1− q)(r − s) (64)
> (1− ξ
6
)2q(r − s) (65)
> (1− ξ
3
)q(r − s), (66)
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where (64) is due to Proposition 5 and (65) is due to q ≤ ξ6 .
To prove (61), we have
Z[s, r] < E[Z[s, r]] +
ξ
6
E[X[s, r]] (67)
≤ (1− ξ) q
1− q (r − s) +
ξ
6
q(r − s) (68)
< (1− 2ξ
3
)q(r − s) (69)
where (67) is due to (36), (68) is due to (30), and (69) is due to q ≤ ξ6 .
To prove (62), we have
Z[s, r] < (1− 2ξ
3
)q(r − s) (70)
<
1− 2ξ3
1− ξ6
X[s, r] (71)
< (1− ξ
2
)X[s, r], (72)
where (70) is due to (69) and (71) is due to (59).
The inequality (63) is straightforward by (61) and (60).
Definition 11. (Typical event) For all integers 1 ≤ s < r, define the typical event with respect to [s, r]
as
G[s, r] := ∩0≤a<s,b≥0E[s− a, r + b]. (73)
The event G[s, r] occurs when the events E[s − a, r + b] simultaneously occurs for all a, b, i.e., the
“E” events occur over all intervals that contain [s, r]. The event G represents a collection of outcomes
that constrain the number of blocks mined in all intervals that contain [s, r], including arbitrarily large
intervals that terminate in the arbitrarily far future. Intuitively, we have defined G[s, r] to allow the
“good” properties mentioned in Lemma 10 to extend to all intervals containing [s, r] under the event.
It is important to note that the typical events defined in [3], [9] requires the interval to be bounded by
b < rmax where rmax denotes a finite execution horizon. In contrast, the typical event is defined in this
paper to allow for results for infinite horizon.
Lemma 12. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r,
P (G[s, r]) > 1− 5γ−2q−2e−γq(r−s). (74)
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Proof. Due to the stationarity of X , Y and Z processes, P (E[s, r]) = P (E[1, r − s + 1]) for all s, r.
Evidently the probability only depends on the length of the interval r − s.
P (Gc[s, r]) = P (∪0≤a<s,b≥0Ec[s− a, r + b]) (75)
= P (∪0≤a<s,b≥0Ec[1, r − s+ a+ b+ 1]) (76)
≤
∑
0≤a<s,b≥0
P (Ec[1, r − s+ a+ b+ 1]) (77)
=
∞∑
k=0
∑
0≤a<s,b≥0:a+b=k
P (Ec[1, r − s+ k + 1]) (78)
<
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)P (Ec[1, r − s+ k + 1]) (79)
<
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)4e−γq(r−s+k) (80)
= 4e−γq(r−s)
∞∑
k=0
(k + 1)e−γqk (81)
=
4
(1− e−γq)2 e
−γq(r−s). (82)
According to (10) and (39), γq ≤ 16 · 1180 = 11080 . The lemma is thus established using the fact that
1− e−x ≥
√
4
5x for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 11080 .
Lemma 13. All honest blockchains must have identical length by every round.
Proof. This is a simple consequence of the fact that all honest miners have seen the same blocks and
every honest miner adopts the longest blockchain at the end of every round.
Lemma 14. (Lemma 6 in [3]) Suppose some blockchain’s kth block B is mined by an honest miner in
a uniquely successful round. Then the kth block of every blockchain is either B or an adversarial block.
Proof. Suppose the kth block of another blockchain is an honest block B′ 6= B. Let r and r′ denote the
rounds in which B and B′ are mined, respectively. Then we must have r 6= r′ by assumption that B
is mined in a uniquely successful round. Since both B and B′ are mined and adopted as the kth block
by some honest miners, all other honest miners must have adopted a blockchain of length at least k by
round r∗ = min{r+1, r′+1}. Hence, all honest blocks mined after round r∗ will extend a blockchain
longer than k. This contradicts the assumption that B and B′ are both at position k of some miner’s
blockchain. Hence the proof of Lemma 14.
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... 
Round 𝑠
Round  𝑟
Chain length
≥ 𝑙 + 𝑋[𝑠, 𝑟]
... 
𝑙
... 
Fig. 1. Illustration for Lemma 15.
Lemma 15. (Lemma 7 in [3]) Let 1 ≤ s < r be integers. Suppose an honest blockchain is of length l
by round s. Then by round r, the length of every honest blockchain is at least l +X[s, r].
Proof. By induction: Consider r = s + 1. All honest miners’ blockchains are of identical length l by
round s according to Lemma 13. If X[s] = 0, X[s, s+ 1] = 0. If X[s] = 1, at least one honest block is
broadcast to all miners during round s. Then by round s+1, each honest miner will adopt a blockchain
of at least l + 1 blocks. Thus Lemma 15 is established for the cases of r = s+ 1.
Assume by round r1, each honest miner’s blockchain length is at least l+X[s, r1]. If X[r1] = 0, the
claim holds trivially for round r1 + 1. If X[r1] = 1, at least one honest miner will have a blockchain of
length no shorter than l + X[s, r1] + 1 by round r1. Then according to Lemma 13, each honest miner
will adopt a blockchain of length at least l+X[s, r1 + 1] by round r1 + 1. By induction on r1, Lemma
15 holds.
Lemma 16. (Blockchain growth lemma) For all integers 1 ≤ s < r and k ≥ 2q(r − s), under typical
event G[s, r], every honest miner’s k-deep block by round r must be mined before round s.
Proof. The blockchain growth of an honest miner during rounds {s, . . . , r − 1} is upper bounded by
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... 
Current round 𝑟
𝑘th deep block  
𝑚 ≥
𝑘
2𝑞
rounds  
... 
Fig. 2. Illustration for Lemma 16.
... 
Round 𝑠1
Round 𝑠
≥ (1 −
𝜉
6
)𝑞 𝑟 − 𝑠1
chain growth... 
Round 𝑟
... 
Fig. 3. Illustration for blockchain growth theorem.
X[s, r] + Z[s, r]. Note that
X[s, r] + Z[s, r] <(1 +
ξ
6
)q(r − s) + (1− 2ξ
3
)q(r − s) (83)
<2q(r − s) (84)
≤k, (85)
where (83) is due to (59) and (61). Thus, the k-deep block must be mined before round s.
Theorem 17. (Blockchain growth theorem) Let r, s, s1 be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s1 ≤ s < r. Then under
typical event G[s, r], the length of every honest blockchain must increase by at least (1 − ξ6)q(r − s1)
during rounds {s1, . . . , r}.
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Proof. Under G[s, r],
X[s1, r] > (1− ξ
6
)E[X[s1, r]] (86)
= (1− ξ
6
)q(r − s1) (87)
= (1− ξ
6
)q(r − s1), (88)
where (87) is due to (59). According to Lemma 15, the blockchain growth for any honest miner is at
least X[s1, r] during [s1, r].
Let len(C) denote the length of a blockchain C.
Theorem 18. (Blockchain quality theorem) Let r, s, k be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s < r and k ≥ 2q(r−s).
Suppose an honest miner’s blockchain has more than k blocks by round r. Under event G[s, r], by round
r, at least ξ2 fraction of the last k blocks of this miner’s blockchain are honest.
Proof. The intuition is that under typical event G[s, r], an honest miner’s blockchain grow by at least
X[s, r] according to Lemma 15. Meanwhile, the number of adversarial blocks mined is upper bounded
by (62). Thus, at least ξ2 fraction of blocks must be honest even in the worst case that all adversarial
blocks are included in the blockchain.
To be precise, assume an honest miner adopts blockchain C by round r. Denote Bi as the ith block of
blockchain C (C = B0B1 . . . Blen(C)−1, where B0 is the genesis block). By assumption, len(C) > k. Let
u = len(C)−k. Then the last k blocks of C are Bu . . . Blen(C)−1. Let Bu′ be the last honest block before
Bu. That is to say, u′ = max{u′|u′ ≤ u− 1, Bu′ is honest} (u′ is always well defined as B0 is regarded
as honest). Let r∗ be the round when Bu′ is mined. By Lemma 16, r∗ < s. Let L = len(C) − u′ − 1.
Note that L ≥ k. These definitions are illustrated in Figure 4.
Let x be the number of honest blocks in Bu . . . Blen(C)−1. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show x >
ξ
2k. Since all blocks in Bu′+1 . . . Bu−1 are adversarial, the number of honest blocks in Bu′+1 . . . Blen(C)−1
is also x. Thus, the number of adversarial blocks in Bu′+1 . . . Blen(C)−1 is L− x. Under G[s, r], which
implies that E[r∗ + 1, r] also occurs, we have
L− x ≤ Z[r∗ + 1, r] (89)
< (1− ξ
2
)X[r∗ + 1, r] (90)
≤ (1− ξ
2
)L (91)
≤ L− ξ
2
k, (92)
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𝐵𝑙𝑒𝑛 𝐶 −1
... 
Fig. 4. Illustration to prove blockchain quality theorem.
where (90) is due to (62), (91) is due to Lemma 15, and (92) is due to L ≥ k. From (92), x > ξ2k is
derived.
Let Cdk denote the k-deep prefix of blockchain C. If len(C) ≤ k, let Cdk be the genesis block.
Definition 19. Let G be an event and r be a positive integer. A block or a sequence (of blocks) is said
to be permanent after round r under G if, under event G, the block or sequence remains in all honest
blockchains starting from round r.
Definition 20. Let r be a positive integer. A block or a sequence (of blocks) is said to be -permanent
after round r if, there exists an event G with P (G) > 1−  such that the block or sequence is permanent
after round r under G.
Lemma 21. If a bock or a sequence is -permanent after round r, then it is also -permanent after round
s for every s > r.
Theorem 22. (Common prefix theorem) Let r, s, k be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s < r and k ≥ 2q(r − s).
If by round r an honest blockchain has a k-deep prefix, then the prefix is permanent after round r under
G[s, r] .
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Proof. The intuition is based on Lemma 14: Once a block is mined in a uniquely successful round, a
different block on any other blockchain at the same position must be adversarial. If some adversarial
miners wish to fork the blockchain, they must generate at least one adversarial block during every uniquely
successful round after the common prefix. This can not be true because according to (63), the number
of uniquely successful rounds must be greater than the number of adversarial blocks under the typical
event.
To be precise, we prove the desired result by contradiction. Suppose blockchain C1 whose length is
great than k is adopted by an honest miner P1 by round r. Contrary to the claim, assume r2 > r is the
smallest round by which an honest miner P2 adopts a blockchain C2 such that C
dk
1  C2. Let C ′2 be the
blockchain P2 adopted by round r2 − 1. Note that Cdk1  C ′2.
Assume the last honest block on the common prefix of C ′2 and C2 is mined during round r∗. If r∗ > 0,
this common block of C ′2 and C2 must be more than k deep in C1 by round r. According to Lemma
16, we have r∗ < s, so that
[s, r] ⊂ [r∗ + 1, r2 − 1]. (93)
On the other hand, if r∗ = 0, the last common block is the genesis block. Since s ≥ 1, (93) also holds.
These definitions are illustrated in Figure 5.
By assumption G[s, r], E2[s, r] also occurs, so that Y [s, r] > 0 according to (35). Hence, there must
be at least one uniquely successful round u ∈ {r∗ + 1, . . . , r2 − 2}. According to Lemma 13, all honest
miners have the same chain length. Let lu denote one plus the length of the honest miners’ blockchains
by round u. Suppose honest miner P mines Bu during round u. According to Lemma 14, the luth block
of every blockchain is either Pu or an adversarial block. Because C2 and C ′2 are adopted by an honest
miner after round r2−2, they must be no shorter than max{lu : u is a uniquely successful round in {r∗+
1, . . . , r2 − 2}}.
For every uniquely successful round u in {r∗ + 1, . . . , r2 − 2}, if the luth blocks of C2 and C ′2 are
different, then at least one of them must be adversarial according to Lemma 14. On the other hand,
if the luth block of C2 and C ′2 are identical, the block must be in their common prefix, which must
be adversarial by definition of r∗. Thus, at least one adversarial block is mined during each uniquely
successful round, so that Z[r∗ + 1, r2 − 1] ≥ Y [r∗ + 1, r2 − 1]. However, since [s, r] ⊂ [r∗ + 1, r2 − 1],
E[r∗ + 1, r2 − 1] occurs under G[s, r], so that Z[r∗ + 1, r2 − 1] < Y [r∗ + 1, r2 − 1] according to (63).
Contradiction arises. Hence the proof of the theorem.
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Fig. 5. Illustration to prove common prefix theorem.
IV. THE PRISM BACKBONE PROTOCOL
The Prism protocol is invented and fully described in [9]. Here we describe the Prism backbone with
just enough details to facilitate its analysis. We assume m+1 genesis blocks are generated for the same
number of blockchains during round 0 by honest miners. Blockchain 0 is referred to as the proposer
blockchain. The remaining blockchains are voter blockchains. A block is mined before knowing which
blockchain it will be part of. Sortition relies on the range the nonce’s hash lands in: If a miner find a
nonce whose hash is within [jα, jα + α) for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the mined block belongs to blockchain
i. Mining difficulty can be adjusted by changing parameter α. This sortition scheme ensures the mining
power of both honest and adversarial miners are evenly distributed across different voting blockchains
and the proposer blockchain.
To certify its level, a new honest voter block for blockchain j (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m) points to blockchain
j’s maximum-level block by a parent link (ties are broken by predefined rules). To certify its level, an
honest new proposer block includes the hash of a maximum-level block in the proposer blockchain and
point to it by a reference link. In addition, an honest new proposer includes one reference link to every
existing block in both proposer and voter blockchains that has not been pointed to by other reference
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links.
Following the bitcoin protocol, an honest miner decides each main voter blockchain by the longest
blockchain rule. The miner determines the its main blockchain by votes from the main voter blockchains.
Let B be an honest block on a voter blockchain j. By B’s ancestors we mean all blocks on B’s path to
the blockchain genesis block following parent links. By saying B votes for a level l, we mean B chooses
one proposer block among all proposer blocks at level l according to a predefined rule, and points to its
choice with a reference link. An honest voter block votes for all levels which have not been voted by its
ancestors.
A voter blockchain is allowed to vote only once for each level (more votes from the same voter
blockchain are discarded). That is to say, proposer blocks on the same level receive m votes in total.
At each level, the proposer block with most votes is elected as a leader block, with ties broken by a
predefined rule. The sequence of leader blocks over all levels is called the leader sequence.
A miner generates its final ledger based on its leader sequence. Given a leader sequence B0B1 . . . Bl,
each leader block Bi defines an epoch. Added to the ledger are the blocks which are pointed to by Bi,
as well as other blocks reachable from Bi but have not been included in previous epochs. The list of
blocks are sorted topologically, with ties broken by their contents. Since the blocks referenced are mined
independently, there can be double spends or redundant transactions. An end user can create a valid
ledger by keeping only the first transaction among double spends or redundant transactions.
For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m and r = 1, 2, . . . , let Hj [r] denote the total number of honest blocks mined during
round r for blockchain j. Following the definitions in Section III, for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m and r = 1, 2, . . .,
we also define
Xj [r] =
1, if Hj [r] ≥ 10, otherwise, (94)
Yj [r] =
1, if Hj [r] = 10, otherwise, (95)
and let Zj [r] be the total number adversarial blocks mined for blockchain j during round r.
Definition 23. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r and 0 ≤ j ≤ m, define event
Ej [s, r] := E1,j [s, r] ∩ E2,j [s, r] ∩ E3,j [s, r] (96)
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where
E1,j [s, r] :=
{
(1− ξ
6
)E[Xj [s, r]] < Xj [s, r] < (1 +
ξ
6
)E[Xj [s, r]]
}
(97)
E2,j [s, r] :=
{
(1− ξ
6
)E[Yj [s, r]] < Yj [s, r]
}
(98)
E3,j [s, r] :=
{
Zj [s, r] < E[Zj [s, r]] +
ξ
6
E[Xj [s, r]]
}
. (99)
We note that for integers 0 ≤ j ≤ m and r ≥ 1, Hj [r], Xj [r], Yj [r], and Zj [r] here are identically
distributed as H[r], X[r], Y [r], and Z[r] defined in Section III. Also, for 1 ≤ s < r, Ej [s, r] is defined
in the same manner as E[s, r]. Thus, the proposer blockchain and all voter blockchains satisfy similar
properties as in Lemma 10:
Lemma 24. (Typical properties lemma for proposer and voter blockchain) For all integers 1 ≤ s < r
and 0 ≤ j ≤ m, under event Ej [s, r], the following holds:
(1− ξ
6
)q(r − s) < Xj [s, r] < (1 + ξ
6
)q(r − s) (100)
Yj [s, r] > (1− ξ
3
)q(r − s) (101)
Zj [s, r] < (1− 2ξ
3
)q(r − s) (102)
Zj [s, r] < (1− ξ
2
)Xj [s, r] (103)
Zj [s, r] < Yj [s, r]. (104)
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 10.
Definition 25. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r and 0 ≤ j ≤ m, define blockchain j’s typical event with
respect to [s, r] as
Gj [s, r] := ∩0≤a<s,b≥0Ej [s− a, r + b]. (105)
Lemma 26. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r and 0 ≤ j ≤ m,
P (Gj [s, r]) > 1− 5γ−2q−2e−γq(r−s) (106)
where γ is defined in (39).
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 12.
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Since the proposer blockchain and all voter blockchains grow in the same manner as how a bitcoin
blockchain grows, the blockchain growth lemma and blockchain growth theorem remain valid:
Lemma 27. Let 1 ≤ s < r and 0 ≤ j ≤ m be integers. Suppose an honest voter blockchain j is of length
l by round s. Then by round r, the length of every honest voter blockchain j is at least l +Xj [s, r].
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 15.
Lemma 28. (Blockchain growth lemma for voter and proposer blockchain) For all integers 1 ≤ s < r,
k ≥ 2q(r − s) and 0 ≤ j ≤ m, under typical event Gj [s, r], every honest miner’s k-deep block of
blockchain j by round r must be mined before round s.
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 16.
Theorem 29. (Blockchain growth theorem for voter and proposer blockchain) Let r, s, s1 be integers
satisfying 1 ≤ s1 ≤ s < r. Let j be an integer satisfying 0 ≤ j ≤ m. Then under typical event Gj [s, r],
the length of every honest miner’s blockchain j must grow by at least (1 − ξ6)q(r − s1) during rounds
{s1, . . . , r}.
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Theorem 17.
Since the protocol for voter blockchains is identical to that of bitcoin, the blockchain quality theorem
and the common prefix theorem hold for all voter blockchains.
Theorem 30. (Blockchain quality theorem for voter blockchain) Let r, s, k, j be integers satisfying 1 ≤
s < r, k ≥ 2q(r − s) and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Suppose an honest blockchain has more than k blocks by round
r. Under event Gj [s, r], at least
ξ
2 fraction of the last k blocks of this blockchain j are honest.
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Theorem 18.
Theorem 31. (Common prefix theorem for voter blockchain) Let r, s, k, j be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s < r,
k ≥ 2q(r− s) and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. If by round r an honest voter blockchain j has a k prefix, then the prefix
is permanent after round r under Gj [s, r].
Proof. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Theorem 22.
Since the leader sequence of the proposer blockchain is decided by votes instead of the longest
blockchain rule, the blockchain quality theorem and common prefix theorem do not immediately extend
to the leader sequence of the proposer blockchain.
July 12, 2019 DRAFT
22
Define Rl to be
Rl := the round in which the first proposer block on level l is mined. (107)
Define
k = 6mγ
−2q−2e−γ
k
2 , k = 1, 2, . . . (108)
where γ is given by (39).
Definition 32. We let LedSeql(r) denote the proposer blockchain’s leader sequence up to level l by round
r.
Lemma 33. Consider a given level l. Let k be a positive integer. If by some round r > max
{
k
2q , Rl + 1
}
,
every voter blockchain contains at least one honest block mined after round Rl which is at least k-deep,
then LedSeql(r) is k-permanent after round r.
Proof. Let
s = r −
⌊
k
2q
⌋
, (109)
which must be a positive integer because 2qr > k. Define
G = ∩j=1,2,...,mGj [s, r]. (110)
For j = 1, . . . ,m, let Bj denote an honest block on an honest voter blockchain j which is mined
after round Rl and is at least k-deep by round r. According to Theorem 31, Bj and its ancestors are
permanent after round r under Gj [s, r] . Hence, B1, . . . , Bm and all their ancestors must be permanent
after round r under G. Thus, all voter blockchains’ voting are permanent. Since B1, . . . , Bm are honest,
they would have voted for all levels up to level l of the proposer blockchain by the voting rule. Hence,
the leader block sequence up to level l is permanent after round r under G. Note that
P (G) = 1− P (∪j=1,2,...,mGcj [s, r]) (111)
≥ 1−
m∑
j=1
P (Gcj [s, r]) (112)
= 1−mP (Gc1[s, r]) (113)
> 1− 5mγ−2q−2e−γq(r−s), (114)
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where (112) is due to the union bound, (113) is due to symmetry of all voter blockchains, (114) is due
to Lemma 26. By (109), we have 2q(r − s+ 1) > k, so that (114) becomes
P (G) > 1− 5mγ−2q−2e−γ k2+γq (115)
> 1− 6mγ−2q−2e−γ k2 (116)
= 1− k (117)
where (116) is due to eγq < 65 . Thus, the leader block sequence up to level l is k-permanent after round
r.
Lemma 34. If positive integers R, r, and k satisfy
r ≥ 2(k + 1)
(1− ξ6)ξq
+ 1, (118)
then right before round R + r, with probability at least 1 − k, all honest voter blockchains have an
honest block mined after round R which is at least k deep.
Proof. Let
` =
⌈
2k
ξ
⌉
. (119)
Let
s1 =
⌊
k
qξ
⌋
. (120)
Then
` ≥ 2k
ξ
(121)
≥ 2q
⌊
k
qξ
⌋
(122)
= 2qs1. (123)
According to the Theorem 29, under event Gj [R,R+r], an honest voter blockchain j’s growth during
{R,R+ 1, . . . , R+ r − 1} is at least
(1− ξ
6
)qr ≥ 2k
ξ
+ 1 (124)
> `, (125)
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where (124) is due to (118) and (125) is due to (119). According to Theorem 30 and (123), under event
Gj [R + r − s1, R + r], at least ξ2 fraction of the last ` blocks of this voter blockchain j are honest.
Because ξ2` ≥ k, the earliest of these honest blocks must be at least k deep.
By (118) and (120), it is easy to see that s1 ≤ r. Hence Gj [R+ r− s1, R+ r] ⊂ Gj [R,R+ r]. Define
G = ∩j=1,2,...,mGj [R+ r − s1, R+ r]. (126)
Under event G, by round R + r, every honest voter blockchain has an honest block mined after round
R which is at least k deep. The probability of the typical event can be lower bounded:
P (G) = P (∩j=1,2,...,mGj [R+ r − s1, R+ r]) (127)
= 1− P (∪j=1,2,...,mGcj [R+ r − s1, R+ r]) (128)
≥ 1−mP (Gc1[R+ r − s1, R+ r]) (129)
> 1− 5mγ−2q−2e−γqs1 (130)
> 1− 6mγ−2q−2e−γqs1 , (131)
where (129) is due to the union bound and symmetry of all voter blockchains and (130) is due to Lemma
26. Moreover,
qs1 > q
(
k
qξ
− 1
)
(132)
=
k
ξ
− q (133)
> k − 1
6
(134)
>
k
2
, (135)
where (132) is due to (120). Therefore,
P (G) > 1− 6mγ−2q−2e−γ k2 (136)
= 1− k, (137)
In summary, by round R + r, with probability at least 1 − k, all honest voter blockchains have an
honest block mined after round R which is at least k deep.
Theorem 35. Fix  ∈ (0, 1). Let Rl be the round during which the first proposer block on level l is
mined. For every integer
r ≥ 5
(1− ξ6)ξγq
log
12mγ−2q−2

, (138)
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the leader sequence up to level l is −permanent after round Rl + r.
Proof. Let
k =
⌈
2
γ
log
12mγ−2q−2

⌉
, (139)
and
s =
⌈
2(k + 1)
(1− ξ6)ξq
+ 1
⌉
. (140)
Let k be as defined as in (108).
According to Lemma 34 and (140), by round Rl + s, all honest voter blockchains have an honest
block which is mined after Rl and is at least k deep with probability at least 1 − k. Under this event,
according to Lemma 33 (evidently, Rl + s > k2q ), the leader sequence up to level l is k-permanent after
round Rl+ s. Therefore, the leader sequence up to level l is 2k-permanent after round Rl+ s. Note that
k = 6mγ
−2q−2e−γ
k
2 (141)
≤ 6mγ−2q−2e− log 12mγ
−2q−2
 (142)
=

2
. (143)
the leader sequence up to level l is -permanent after round Rl + s.
From (139), it is easy to verify that k > 10. As a consequence, we have
s <
2(k + 1)
(1− ξ6)ξq
+ 2 (144)
=
2k + 2 + 2(1− ξ6)ξq
(1− ξ6)ξq
(145)
<
5
2(k − 1)
(1− ξ6)ξq
(146)
<
5
(1− ξ6)ξγq
log
12mγ−2q−2

(147)
≤ r, (148)
where (144) is due to (139), (146) is due to k > 10, (147) is due to (139), and (148) is by (138).
Since r > s,the leader sequence up to level l is -permanent after round Rl + r by Lemma 21.
Theorem 36. (Blockchain quality theorem for proposer blockchain) Let r, s, k be integers satisfying
1 ≤ s < r and k ≥ 2q(r− s). Suppose an honest proposer blockchain has more than k leader blocks by
round r. Under event G0[s, r], by round r, at least
ξ
2 fraction of the last k leader blocks of the proposer
blockchain are honest.
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Fig. 6. Illustration to prove blockchain quality theorem for proposer blockchain.
Proof. Let l denote the highest level of the proposer blockchain by round r. Evidently l > k. Let l∗ be
the highest level before l− k+1 on which the first proposer block is honest. l∗ may be as high as l− k
and as low as 0, which corresponds to the genesis block. Let r∗ be the round when the first block on
level l∗ is mined. If this block is the genesis block, then r∗ = 0. If r∗ > 0, since blocks on level l∗ are
more than k blocks away from the last level by round r, we have r∗ < s according to Lemma 28. In any
cases, we have [s, r] ⊂ [r∗ +1, r]. An illustration of the said proposer blocks and blockchain is given in
Figure 6.
Since the first proposer block on every level within {l∗+1, . . . , l−k} is adversarial, from level l∗+1
to level l, there must be at least one adversarial block on every level except (possibly) on the levels
between l− k+1 and l where the leading block is honest. Let x be the number of honest leader blocks
on levels {l − k + 1, . . . , l}. Then, during rounds {r∗ + 1, . . . , r − 1}, the total number of adversarial
proposer blocks is no fewer than l − l∗ − x, i.e.,
Z0[r
∗ + 1, r] ≥ l − l∗ − x. (149)
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Under G0[s, r], E0[r∗ + 1, r] occurs. Thus,
x ≥ l − l∗ − Z0[r∗ + 1, r] (150)
> l − l∗ − (1− ξ
2
)X0[r
∗ + 1, r] (151)
≥ ξ
2
(l − l∗) (152)
≥ ξ
2
k, (153)
where (151) is due to (103), (152) is due to Lemma 27, and (153) is due to l − l∗ ≥ k. To sum up, we
have x > ξ2k and the proof is complete.
Definition 37. A transaction tx is honest if it has been broadcast, and no other transaction spending
from the same unspent output has been broadcast.
Note that the notion of honesty is applicable only to transactions which have been broadcast.
Definition 38. A transaction is said to be -permanent after round r if, with probability at least 1 − ,
it remains on the final ledger of every honest miner after round r.
Lemma 39. Suppose right before round r, the leader block on level l is honest. Suppose this leader block
is mined during round R. If an honest transaction enters a block and the block is broadcast by round
R, then every honest miner’s final ledger generated by LedSeql(r) will include this honest transaction.
Proof. Suppose the honest transaction tx enters block B which is broadcast by round R. Note that B
may be honest or adversarial, a voter block or a leader block, and it can be on the main blockchain or
an orphan block. Denote the honest leader block on level l as Bl.
By saying block B is reachable from block A, we mean A can points to B by a sequence of reference
links. According to the Prism protocol, all blocks which are reachable from an honest leader block will
be included in the final ledger. By round R, one of the following three cases must be true:
1) B is not reachable by any blocks. According to the Prism protocol, Bl will reference B, so B will
be included in the final ledger.
2) B is reachable from an honest leader block whose level is smaller than l, then B must already be
included in the final ledger.
3) B is reachable from some block(s), but none of these block(s) is an honest leader block whose
level is smaller than l. Note that the number of proposer blocks by round R is finite, and that reference
links cannot form a circle. Thus, among all the proposer blocks which can reach B, there must be at
least one proposer block which is not referenced by any other block by round R. Denote such a block
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Fig. 7. Illustration to prove Theorem 40
as Br. Then according to the Prism protocol, Bl will reference Br. As a sequence, B will be included
in the final ledger.
Once B is included in the ledger, the honest transaction tx will not be discarded.
Theorem 40. For every  > 0 and every integer
r ≥ 25
(1− ξ6)2ξ2γq
log
24mγ−2q−2

, (154)
an honest transaction that enters into a block is -permanent r rounds after the block is broadcast.
Proof. Let
` =
⌈
(1− ξ
6
)qr
⌉
(155)
k =
⌊
ξ
2
`
⌋
(156)
w =
⌊
`
2q
⌋
(157)
u =
⌊
k
2q
⌋
. (158)
Let R be the round during which the block including the honest transaction is broadcast. Define
G = G0[R+ r − u,R+ r] ∩G0[R+ r − w,R+ r] ∩G0[R,R+ r]. (159)
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Note that 1) According to Theorem 29 and (155), under G0[R,R+ r], the proposer blockchain grows
by at least ` leader blocks during rounds {R, . . . , R + r}. 2) According to Theorem 36, under event
G0[R+ r−w,R+ r], by round R+ r the last ` leader blocks includes at least ξ2 fraction of honest ones.
Since k ≤ ξ2`, at least k out of the last ` leader blocks are honest. 3) According to Lemma 28, under
event G0[R+ r− u,R+ r], the deepest one of these k honest leader blocks is mined at least k2q rounds
before round R+ r. 4) We have
k
2q
≥ 1
2q
⌊
ξ
2
`
⌋
(160)
≥ 1
2q
⌊
ξ
2
(1− ξ
6
)qr
⌋
(161)
≥ 1
2q
⌊
ξ
2
(1− ξ
6
)q
25
(1− ξ6)2ξ2γq
log
24mγ−2q−2

⌋
(162)
≥ 1
2q
⌊
25
2(1− ξ6)ξγ
log
24mγ−2q−2

⌋
(163)
>
1
2q
(
25
2(1− ξ6)ξγ
log
24mγ−2q−2

− 1
)
(164)
>
1
2q
(
10
(1− ξ6)ξγ
log
24mγ−2q−2

)
(165)
=
5
(1− ξ6)ξγq
log
12mγ−2q−2

2
, (166)
where (160) is due to (156), (161) is due to (155), and (165) is obvious due to ξ ∈ (0, 1]. According to
Theorem 35 and (166), the deepest honest leader block is 2 -permanent after round R + r under event
G. Next, we will lower bound probability of G.
Note that
u ≤ k
2q
(167)
≤ ξ`
4q
(168)
<
`
2q
− 1 (169)
< w, (170)
where (168) is due to (156), (169) is due to q ≤ ξ6 , and (170) is due to (157). Also,
w ≤ `
2q
(171)
≤ r, (172)
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where (171) is due to (157) and (172) is due to (155). We have u < w < s. According to definition,
G0[R+ r − u,R+ r] ⊂ G0[R+ r − w,R+ r] ⊂ G0[R,R+ r]. Then,
P (G) =P (G0[R+ r − u,R+ r]) (173)
>1− 5γ−2q−2e−γqu (174)
>1− 5γ−2q−2e−γq( k2q−1) (175)
≥1− 5γ−2q−2e−
5
(1− ξ
6
)ξ
log 24mγ
−2q−2

+γq
(176)
>1− 5γ−2q−2e− log 10mγ
−2q−2
 (177)
≥1− 5γ−2q−2e− log 10γ
−2q−2
 (178)
=1− 
2
, (179)
where (174) is due to Lemma 26, (175) is due to (158), (176) is due to (166), (177) is due to 0 < ξ ≤ 1,
and (178) is due to m ≥ 1. According to the union rule, the deepest honest leader block is -permanent
after round R+r. According to Lemma 39, the honest transaction will become a -permanent transaction
after round R+ r.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the bitcoin backbone protocol and the Prism backbone protocol. Unlike
in prior work we allow the blockchains to have unlimited lifespan. Under the new setting, we rigorously
establish a blockchain growth property, a blockchain quality property, and a common prefix property for
the bitcoin backbone protocol. Under this framework, we have also proved a blockchain growth property
and a blockchain quality property of the leader sequence in the Prism protocol. We have also shown
that the leader sequence is permanent with high probability after sufficient amount of wait time. As a
consequnce, every honest transaction will eventually enter the final ledger and become permanent with
probability higher than 1− after a confirmation time proportional to security parameter log 1 . This paper
provide explicit bounds for the bitcoin and the Prism backbone protocols, which furthers understanding
of both protocols and provides practical guidance to public transaction ledger protocol design.
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